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Abstract	
Anarchic hand syndrome (AHS) is characterised by goal-directed movements 
performed without volitional control (agency). Different AHS subtypes have been 
identified; however, few studies have examined the posterior subtype. We report a case 
of AHS following right-hemisphere parietal damage, with left-sided somatosensory and 
proprioceptive impairment. Agency was examined for non-anarchic (volitional) 
movements performed using the anarchic hand. The patient experienced abnormal 
agency for movements whether motor intention and visual feedback were congruent or 
incongruent, but not when intention was absent (passive movement). Findings suggest 
a general disturbance of veridical motor awareness and agency in this case of parietal 
AHS.	
 
Abstract = 98 words 
	
 
Keywords: anarchic hand; agency; motor awareness; parietal lobe.	
	
	
	 	
4 
Introduction	
Anarchic hand syndrome (AHS) is a neurological condition in which complex, 
goal-directed (i.e. purposeful) movements of an upper limb occur without conscious 
volition. The condition has been subject to considerable confusion in scientific and 
popular literature, with the term ‘alien limb’ being applied to a range of different signs 
and symptoms, including the phenomenon currently recognised as AHS (described 
above; see Marchetti & Della Sala, 1998, for a detailed discussion). An unfortunate 
consequence of this confusion has been an intrinsic difficulty revealing the 
neuroanatomical and functional bases of AHS. However, contemporary research 
distinguishes between AHS (as described above) and alien limb (a feeling that the hand 
is foreign and failure to recognise the ownership of one’s limb; Marchetti & Della Sala, 
1998) based on now well-established subcomponents of self-consciousness, namely: 
agency (i.e. the sense that I am the author or controller of my actions), and body 
ownership (i.e. the sense that my body belongs to me; see also Synofzik, Vosgerau & 
Newen, 2008 for further discussion). Thus, alien hand currently describes a disturbance 
of body ownership, while AHS refers to a disturbance of the agency system.	
Historically, AHS has been reported as most frequently occurring following 
damage to the corpus callosum and the supplementary motor area (SMA), with 
involuntary actions thought to arise from a failure to inhibit actions elicited by external 
cues (see Kritikos, Breen & Mattingley, 2005; Riddoch, Humphreys & Edwards, 2001). 
However, a parietal variant of AHS has also been identified, involving damage or 
disconnection of the parietal lobes (Graff-Radford et al., 2013; Scepkowski & Cronin-
Golomb, 2003). Although initially thought of as atypical, recent evidence suggests that 
parietal AHS, particularly involving the right hemisphere, is not uncommon.  For 
instance, Scepkowski and Cronin-Golomb (2003) reviewed more than 50 published 
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cases in which autonomous, complex movements of the upper limb were performed 
against the patient’s will1. Specific consideration was given to 17 cases involving the 
parietal lobe or other posterior brain areas, the majority of which involved damage to 
the right hemisphere.  Although the contribution of parietal damage to the observed 
phenomenon is difficult to establish in some of these cases (owing to the involvement 
of neurodegenerative diseases and/or brain damage to multiple sites), the importance 
of the parietal lobes is clearly supported by two stroke patients with unilateral lesions 
restricted to the parietal lobe (see Carrilho et al., 2001, Case 4: right superior parietal 
lobule damage2; and Leiguarda, Starkstein, Nogues, Berthier & Arbelaiz, 1993, Case 
3: left posterior parietal cortex damage; both cases reported in Scepkowski & Cronin-
Golomb, 2003, p.274, Table 2).	 However, none of the existing cases involved 
circumscribed damage to the right inferior parietal lobe, as reported by the current case 
report.	
Further support for the role of the parietal lobe in AHS symptomatology is 
provided by a recent study by Graff-Radford et al. (2013). They examined patients with 
“observable involuntary motor activity” who experienced an extremity as “foreign” or 
“having a will of its own” (p. 1881)3. A retrospective analysis of medical records from 
patients seen in a neurology department between 1st January 1996 and 11th July 2011 
identified 150 patients fitting these criteria, 14 of which were a result of cerebrovascular 
events (10 right hemisphere, 4 left hemisphere). A major finding of the study was the 
involvement of the parietal lobe in all 14 of these cases. Several cases involved damage 
to more than one right-hemisphere structure, included the parietal lobe, while three 
																																																								
1 The original authors use the term ‘alien hand’ to describe this phenomenology. 
2 This case is incorrectly reported as left parietal cortex damage by Scepkowski & 
Cronin-Golomb (2003). The original paper reports right parietal lobule damage. 
3 The original authors use the term ‘alien hand’ to describe this phenomenology. 
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cases involved damage restricted to the right parietal lobe (two anterior parietal lobe 
and one unspecified: cases 3, 9 & 10, Graff-Radford et al., 2013, p. 1886, Table 4), 
again suggesting a key role of this brain region in the phenomenon.	
Although these studies suggest that parietal-type AHS not uncommon, there 
remain relatively few empirical studies of the phenomenon. One notable exception is a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of a patient with extensive right 
parietal lobe damage, who performed spontaneous (flexion-extension) movements of 
the left hand (fingers) without conscious will (Assal, Schwartz & Vuilleumier, 2007). 
Movements performed without conscious volition were found to correspond with 
isolated activity in the primary motor cortex (M1), whereas voluntary movements of 
the same limb involved widespread bilateral activity in the parietal and premotor areas. 
Thus, parietal AHS might be explained by an uncoupling or bypassing of distributed 
volitional networks from regions responsible for motor production (i.e. M1).		
This theoretical explanation of AHS is consistent with the established role of 
the parietal lobe in a multitude of sensorimotor functions relating to the body, 
movement and self-awareness (Sirigu et al., 2004). In particular, Desmurget and Sirigu 
(2009) propose a functional neuroanatomical model identify the posterior parietal 
cortex as important in motor awareness (i.e. being conscious of our own movements), 
claiming that conscious motor intentions and predictions regarding the sensory 
consequences of an action are generated or monitored in posterior parietal areas. These 
predictive processes (as opposed to afferent sensory information) give rise to our 
everyday, subjective awareness of movement. A parallel process of low-level 
(unconscious) comparison between actual and expected sensory information is 
performed in premotor areas during motor execution. These premotor areas allow errors 
of limited magnitude to be automatically and unconsciously corrected via internal 
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feedback loops; however, an error signal is generated to draw conscious attention to 
errors (i.e. veridical motor awareness) when they are too large to be corrected without 
conscious awareness.  
This account of the parietal lobe is supported by neuropsychological studies, as 
well as functional neuroimaging and behavioural experiments in healthy people. Other 
pathologies of motor awareness, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e. unawareness 
of paralysis) visuospatial neglect, and delusions of control (passivity) are well 
established as being associated with abnormalities in fronto-parietal networks (Berti et 
al., 2005; Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000; Preston, Jenkinson & Newport, 2010). 
Similarly, functional neuroimaging of healthy participants during simulated anarchic 
movements (i.e. experimentally induced mismatches between motor intention and 
visual feedback) reveal activation of a right fronto-parietal network (Leube, Knoblich, 
Erb & Kircher, 2003). The frontal component is believed to detect mismatches between 
own actions and visual consequences, while the parietal component is thought to be 
involved in a more complex attribution process, such as when the distinction between 
oneself and another is critical and ambiguous during goal-directed movements. This is 
further supported by neuroimaging studies of motor awareness, which employ self-
other discrimination tasks in healthy participants to examine the sense of agency. These 
studies reveal increased activity of the right inferior parietal lobe during ‘other’ 
judgments (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002). By contrast, motor awareness and 
the sense of agency are impaired for self-other attributions of goal-directed movements 
when transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is used to disrupt the right inferior 
parietal lobe (Preston & Newport, 2008). This disruption of the inferior parietal lobe 
leads to an (apparently counterintuitive) increase in ‘other’ judgments (cf. Farrer and 
colleagues, 2002, 2003), which can be explained in terms of an interruption to the 
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generation and monitoring of motor intentions and predictions, which form the basis of 
normal motor awareness (see Preston & Newport, for further discussion). 
Despite this wealth of evidence linking the parietal lobe with awareness of 
volitional movement, and the increasing recognition of a parietal subtype of AHS, 
experimental studies of parietal AHS remain scarce. Such studies are necessary to 
develop a clear nosology and understanding of the functional and neural mechanisms 
underpinning different types of AHS (Scepkowski & Cronin-Golomb, 2013). We 
therefore report here a novel case of AHS following damage to the right inferior parietal 
lobe. To our knowledge, there are no existing experimental studies of agency in an AHS 
patient with this particular type of lesion. Given the proposed role of the parietal lobe 
in motor awareness (Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009), and evidence regarding the specific 
role of the inferior parietal lobe in attribution of goal-directed actions and agency 
(Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Preston & Newport, 2008), we expected these 
functions to be impaired in our patient (LX). Specifically, in line with the theory of 
Desmurget and Sirigu (2009), and findings of Preston and Newport (2008), we 
hypothesised that damage to the inferior parietal lobe would impair the usual 
mechanisms by which conscious motor intentions and sensory predictions are 
generated and monitored. We predicted that this impairment would lead to reduced self-
reports of agency during active (i.e. volitionally generated by the participant / efferent 
motor signal present), goal-directed movements of the affected limb, regardless of 
whether motor intention and visual feedback were congruent or incongruent. 
Neurologically intact participants, on the other hand, would only deny agency when 
feedback was incongruent and thus did not accurately represent their actions. We 
further predicted that passive movements (i.e. generated by the experimenter / efferent 
motor signal absent) would result in negative agency judgments, in line with controls, 
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and the established finding that efferent motor signals are necessary for the sense of 
agency to emerge in such tasks (see Tsakiris, Longo & Haggard, 2010). The current 
study therefore assessed the subjective sense of agency for (active and passive) 
movements performed by the left (anarchic) arm of patient LX and healthy controls, 
under conditions of sensorimotor congruence and incongruence. 
Method	
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Case report	
At the time of testing LX was a 26-year-old right-handed woman. She was diagnosed 
with relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis at age 23, and placed on monthly 
intravenous infusions of Tysabri® (natalizumab). Two weeks following the seventh 
infusion LX developed a venous sinus thrombosis with venous infarction and 
haemorrhage into her right parietal lobe (Figure 1a). A second MRI performed shortly 
after the study showed her brain to be free from sclerotic lesions (Figure 1b). Her 
symptoms immediately following the stroke included a complete loss of sensation, 
body positioning and temperature on the left side, extrapersonal neglect, and the 
occurrence of non-volitional (anarchic) movements of the left arm.	
A clinical examination of LX performed by SJE revealed normal tone and 
power in all four limbs. A moderate left inferior homonymous quadrantinopsia was 
revealed on visual field testing. Although pinprick perception is lost on the right side 
of her face she continues to feel light touch, whereas both are lost on the left side of her 
face. Temperature perception is perceived on the right cheek only and lost from all four 
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limbs. Vibration sensation is lost in the left hand but present in the other limbs. Joint 
perception is present for large excursions of the right hand and foot but lost for small 
excursions of the fingers and toes. In the left arm there is no perception of joint position 
at the fingers, wrist or elbow, and at the shoulder she only perceives movement because 
of the way it affects the rest of her body. LX also reported experiencing complex, goal-
directed movements of the left arm which occurred against her will, stating that “at 
times my left hand grabs hold of things and keeps holding them…without meaning to 
do this” and that her left arm would scare her, because of the surprise movements it 
made.  Examples of these behaviours included the arm sometimes pulling her hair or 
“strangling” her during the night, and taking food out of the shopping trolley in the 
supermarket. Despite the arm feeling “strange”, LX never explicitly denied ownership 
of the arm, although she sometimes referred to it in the third person (“it will close 
doors…or pick pens up on its own”).	
A brief neuropsychological assessment identified LX’s current IQ as 106 
(Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999), suggesting some 
decline compared to premorbid levels, which were estimated as 112 (National Adult 
Reading Test; Nelson and Willison, 1991). LX showed no sign of personal neglect 
(comb and razor/compact test; McIntosh, Brodie, Beschin & Robertson, 2000), but 
some extrapersonal neglect (star cancellation test; Halligan, Marshall & Wade, 1989). 	
Materials and Procedure	
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
------------------------------------ 
The experiment was performed by LX and eight right-handed healthy controls 
(HCs) (2 male, mean age=22.50, SD=1.41). The study was approved by a local ethics 
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committee, and conducted in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki.	
Participants sat in front of a metal frame (1m2) that housed a video camera (see 
Figure 2a). To the left of the frame (~25cm from the real hand) was a vertically 
positioned 28” LED monitor. The video camera (shutter speed = 25 frames/s; overall 
temporal delay = 42ms) was fixed to the frame behind a black curtain and connected to 
the display, such that when participants placed their hand through the curtain a life-
sized image of the hand was viewed on the display, but not seen directly. The image 
provided a person-centred view of the hand as seen from above.	A close match between 
the hand on the computer screen and real hand size was achieved by measuring the 
distance from the tip of the forefinger to the base of the palm on the real hand, and then 
using the camera zoom to adjust the screen image until these measurements 
corresponded. The visual display was located to the left of the real hand due to physical 
restrictions in the workspace; however, LX’s ability to see the image, despite mild left-
sided neglect, was checked before each condition. 	
Visual feedback and motor intention were manipulated across four conditions 
(Figure 2b) completed in a pseudorandom order. In the False-Moving condition 
participants were instructed not to move their hand but received false visual feedback 
of their index finger moving (lifting/extension and lowering/flexion in a steady manner 
for 90s). The magnitude of the finger lift (extension-flexion) movement was ~6cm. 
False feedback was achieved by playing a pre-recorded video of the hand, which was 
obtaining surreptitiously during an initial ‘practice’ phase. In the False-Still condition 
participants were instructed to lift and lower their index finger for 90s whilst provided 
with false visual feedback of their hand remaining motionless (pre-recorded video of 
their stationary hand). In the Veridical condition participants were instructed to move 
their index finger and given veridical visual feedback. Finally, in the Passive condition 
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participants were instructed to rest their hand whilst receiving veridical visual feedback 
of their finger being moved passively by the experimenter (lifting and lowering the 
finger via a piece of string attached to a ring worn on the participant’s index finger). 
After each condition participants completed a six-item self-report questionnaire 
adapted from Tsakiris et al. (2010), assessing agency, body ownership/recognition, 
susceptibility (Control 1) and felt limb position (Control 2) (see Figure 3). Participants 
responded orally using a 7-point Likert scale (-3 = ‘strongly disagree’, +3 = ‘strongly 
agree’).	
Results	
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
----------------------------------- 
Overall measures of agency and ownership were produced by calculating the 
mean of the two statements previously identified as relevant for each measure. The two 
control questions (measuring susceptibility and limb position) were examined 
individually (since they examine different constructs). 
Due to the HC data being ordinal and non-normally distributed, LX’s 
performance was compared with HCs via bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) 
(DiCiccio & Efron, 1996). Figure 3c shows that LX’s agency ratings fell outside the 
HC CIs in all conditions except Passive. LX never expressed a strong sense of agency 
during the experiment, with scores ranging between +1 and -0.5. Her ratings during the 
Veridical condition were significantly lower than HCs, but were counter intuitively 
high (relative to HCs) during False-Moving and False-Still. LX showed a similarly low 
sense of ownership for the left hand, with responses below the HC CIs in all conditions, 
and never more than -1.0. Responses to control statement 1 were generally low 
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(participants did not feel like they were looking directly at their hand), with LX falling 
inside the HC range. By contrast, LX’s responses to control statement 2 were high 
(indicating a lack of position sense); she fell outside the HC range in all except the 
Veridical condition, in which HCs reported increased difficulty locating their hand.	
Discussion 
This paper provides the first direct examination of agency in parietal-type AHS. 
We predicted that damage to the posterior parietal lobe would impair veridical motor 
awareness and result in reduced self-reports of agency during active (volitional), goal-
directed movements of the affected limb. In line with our prediction, LX reported 
abnormally low agency during the Veridical movement condition, for which HCs felt 
a strong sense of agency. However, her agency scores were higher than HCs in the 
False-Still and False-Moving conditions, for which HCs gave very low agency ratings. 
This result seems to partly contradict our initial prediction; however, it is important to 
note that in both instances LX did not report a strong sense of agency, with her 
responses being close to zero, and only slightly above those of HCs in the False-Moving 
condition. We discuss this unexpected result in more detail below, when considering 
the role of concurrent sensory impairments in our findings. Movement without motor 
signals (i.e. Passive movement) elicited low ratings of agency that were no different 
from HCs (in line with our second prediction). 
Our prediction that agency ratings would deviate from controls in all conditions 
except passive movement might, on first inspection, appear to contradict the idea that 
motor awareness arises from the detection of sensorimotor discrepancies or 
incongruence. Since such incongruence occurs only during certain (i.e. false-moving 
and false-still) conditions in our experiment, one might expect that a deficit in motor 
awareness and abnormal agency ratings would occur only in these conditions. However, 
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this prediction fails to take into account the fact that the posterior parietal lobe is 
involved in monitoring one’s own movements, while parallel, low-level comparison of 
actual and predicted sensory information depends on premotor areas (Desmurget & 
Sirigu, 2009; Sirigu et al., 2004). Thus, damage to the inferior parietal lobe might result 
in poor motor awareness and abnormal agency ratings even when low-level signals of 
sensorimotor incongruence are present, because such signals are not able to engage 
parietal areas responsible for conscious (veridical) motor awareness. Support for this 
explanation can be found in recent theoretical models of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008), 
which propose that agency involves a low-level feeling and a higher-level judgment of 
agency. What is more, this idea is supported by recent neuropsychological (e.g. Preston 
et al., 2010), neuroimaging (e.g. Kühn, Brass & Haggard, 2013), and brain stimulation 
studies (e.g. Preston & Newport, 2008; Weiss, Tsakiris, Haggard & Schütz-Bosbach, 
2014), which highlight the existence of explicit and implicit motor awareness processes. 
However, further research is needed to identify whether both low- and high-level motor 
awareness is impaired in patients with (parietal-type) AHS. 
Overall, our results suggest that LX’s parietal damage impaired veridical motor 
awareness and the sense of agency (Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009). This conclusion is 
consistent with previous research connecting the parietal lobes to agency in both 
healthy (e.g. Farrer et al., 2003; Preston & Newport, 2008) and brain-injured 
individuals (e.g. Preston et al., 2010). Additionally, LX demonstrates that AHS is not 
always purely a deficit of motor control (Frith et al., 2000). Although AHS often 
involves a failure to inhibit actions elicited by external cues (Frith et al., 2000; Kritikos 
et al., 2005; Riddoch et al., 2001), in at least some instances (e.g. the parietal-type 
described here) AHS can involve abnormal agency (see Synofzik et al., 2008). In fact, 
damage to the SMA, which is a frequent cause of AHS, has been found to underlie an 
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implicit sense of agency (see Kühn et al., 2013; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell & 
Haggard, 2010). However, we acknowledge that the number of questionnaire items and 
trials used in our study limit our conclusions. Also, it is possible that participants 
interpreted the questionnaire items in subtly different ways (e.g. questions regarding 
being in control of one limbs can be interpreted in a general sense [i.e. “was I capable 
of controlling the hand I was looking at?”] or specific sense [“was I actually controlling 
the hand I was looking at?”]), thereby increasing variability in the data. Further research 
is therefore needed to corroborate these findings in parietal and other subtypes of AHS, 
using various measures of agency (e.g. implicit and explicit measures; see Kühn et al., 
2013; Preston et al., 2010; Weiss et al., 2014). 
An interesting, additional finding or our study was that LX expressed 
consistently low ownership for her anarchic hand. Previous research identifies the 
inferior parietal lobe as part of an attentional network involved in stimulus-driven 
detection of behaviourally relevant stimuli (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), damage to 
which has been found in disorders of body ownership (Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira & 
Fotopoulou, 2013). In healthy controls, evidence for a dissociation between agency and 
body ownership has been somewhat contentious, with some studies supporting the 
independence of these components (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris et al., 2010), 
while others suggest some degree of shared relationship (Tsakiris, Prabhu & Haggard, 
2006; Balslev, Nielsen, Lund, Law & Paulson, 2006). Accounts of anarchic hand are 
equally controversial, as some researchers regard personification of the limb to indicate 
a deficit in ownership (Doody & Jankovic, 1992), while others propose that 
personification reflects a selective deficit in agency and not ownership (Synofzik et al., 
2008). Our results support the suggestion that agency and ownership are distinct 
processes, since changes in agency were observed independent of (stable albeit poor) 
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ownership of the anarchic hand. Of further interest is the finding that, despite her low 
ratings of ownership for the affected hand, LX never explicitly denied ownership of the 
hand during clinical interviews (see ‘case report’ section, above). This finding might 
be explained in terms of the improved sensitivity of experimental measures in 
comparison to clinical interviews, particularly at discriminating between subtle 
dissociations. This suggestion is also consistent with the idea that (like agency) 
ownership comprises different low- and high-level processes: i.e., a non-conceptual 
feeling of ownership and a conceptual judgment of ownership (Synofzik et al., 2008). 
Unfortunately, we are unable to draw further conclusions regarding the role of 
ownership in AHS, given LX’s atypical neuropathology and the limited assessment 
performed. Therefore, future research into AHS should also seek to experimentally 
examine different levels of body ownership in detail. 
Possible criticisms of our study are that LX’s ratings reflect a negative response 
bias, failure to give extreme ratings, or inability to make decisions. However, LX 
responded within the HC range for control statement 1, disagreeing with the assertion 
that she was looking directly at her hand rather than a video image. Her strong 
disagreement with this statement demonstrates her ability to make decisions and give 
extreme ratings, thereby negating these as explanations for her ambivalent agency 
ratings. Likewise, LX’s agreement with control statement 2 (“it felt like I could not 
really tell where my hand was”) shows willingness to provide extreme positive scores, 
thus negating a negative-response bias. These responses are also consistent with her 
poor position sense. 
Finally, in addition to its role in motor awareness, the parietal cortex is known 
to play a key role in the integration of multisensory information relating to actions, via 
numerous connections with cortical and subcortical regions related to sensory and 
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motor signals (Daprati, Sirigu & Nico, 2010). Thus, concurrent sensory impairments 
arising from parietal damage may also contribute to LX’s abnormal sense of agency 
and AHS. For example, there might be an increased tendency to guess or mildly 
confabulate agency in the absence of reliable sensory feedback, especially when the 
situation is ambiguous or uncertain. The importance of proprioceptive information in 
action recognition is highlighted by Farrer, Franck, Paillard and Jeannerod (2003), who 
found that neurologically healthy individuals were able to recognise movements as their 
own using only proprioceptive information (during passive movement), while, 
conversely, a patient with complete haptic deafferentation including loss of 
proprioception was unable to recognise her own movements. Interestingly, the 
deafferented patient showed a tendency to misidentify actions as being her own rather 
than deny that the movements were hers, suggesting that proprioceptive loss alone may 
increase the sense of agency. LX’s increased ratings of agency during false-still and 
false-moving conditions are consistent with this suggestion. Further research is needed 
to disentangle the contribution of comorbid sensory complications in abnormal agency 
and AHS following parietal damage. 
In conclusion, our study highlights the role of veridical motor awareness in 
parietal AHS, demonstrating, for the first time, impaired agency for volitional 
movements of the anarchic limb. Further experimental studies are needed to examine 
the phenomenology of parietal-type AHS in detail. Results from the type of 
experimental task described here should be compared across the three major varieties 
of AHS (i.e. parietal, frontal and callosal), and differences in performance between the 
anarchic and unaffected hands examined. Such studies will help develop a clear 
nosology of AHS and reveal the functional neuroanatomy of different subtypes.	
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Figures	
	
Figure 1. a) An MRI showing the larger part of LX’s lesion located in the right inferior 
parietal lobule; at the anterior margin the lesion encroaches into the superior temporal 
gyrus and angular gyrus, and at the posterior boundary there is some damage also 
traversing the occipito-parietal junction. A follow-up MRI (b) performed upon 
completion of the study shows LX’s brain to be free from sclerotic lesions. All images 
are radiological convention (right shown on left side). 
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Figure 2. a) A schematic representation of the experimental set-up. The video camera 
was suspended from the centre of the tripod and connected to an LED display, located 
to the left of the real hand in an standard vertical orientation, to produce a person-
centred view of the unseen hand as seen from above. Four experimental conditions (b) 
were created using this set-up via the manipulation of intention and visual feedback.	
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Figure 3. Questionnaire statements and responses for control statement 1 (panel a), 
control statement 2 (panel b), agency scores (panel c), and ownership scores (panel d). 
LX (crosses) fell within HCs (open circles) 95% confidence intervals (error bars) for 
control statement 1 (a), while for control statement 2 (b) LX scored higher than HC 
95% confidence intervals for all conditions except Veridical movement. For the agency 
score (c) LX fell outside HC 95% confidence intervals for all conditions except Passive. 
For the ownership score (d) LX scored lower than HCs 95% confidence intervals in all 
conditions. 
	
